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<sup>\* 42</sup> ISSA, Subsection 3 (1).

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<sup>\* 44</sup> Eg, the Estonian Society of Traumatologists and Orthopaedists Maintains in statements to the EHIF did development of e-services in surgical specialties is complicated. There are almost no patients Whose need for surgical treatment Could be decided upon without the patient being seen in person. The letter addressing this point is in the possession of the author.

<sup>\* 45</sup> The author plans to analyze the topic doctoral dissertation in her.

<sup>\* 46</sup> The Finnish company Oy MeeDoc offers, via its website [fi.meedoc.com](#), consultations with physicians and prescription of medicinal products via video call or chat service for patients in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, England, and Spain. So, through its Web site [medgate.com](#), Swiss telemedicine center Medgate offers around-the-clock e-consultation, issuing prescriptions and certificates of incapacity for work if be necessary.

# Postmodernist wars and theoretical explanations, applications and perspectives

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## Abstract

The article discusses the postmodern war, the fundamental changes taking place in the theoretical and practical terms, as well as the need to study the topics mentioned in terms of the formation of the newest models of warfare. Using military-scientific concepts, the author explains new approaches and concepts of war, an asymmetric paradigm, and also, given their place in the military doctrines of different countries. In addition, some aspects of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were discussed from the point of view of a new paradigm. In conclusion, the author tries to systematize the features of postmodern wars and reflects on possible prospects.

Keywords: postmodern stage, war models, military science, security, asymmetric warfare

## Introduction

The 21st century is characterized by radical changes in the world order system, uncertain prospects of the existing geopolitical situation. The changed military-strategic balance after the events in the Middle East and other hot spots - the expansion of the "nuclear club" (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea), the emergence of new military and political power centers, the unprecedented expansion of international terrorism and military saboteurs influenced the conduct of military operations in different areas of confrontation.

The nature of the most modern or postmodern war is far from previous wars. First of all, the current military phenomenon is understood as an integral and complex strategy. At present, this is reflected in the appearance of terms like "united war", "complex war".

"United war" means: the totality of "economic, information, military, etc." (8, pp. 356-357).

At the same time, although there is no traditional "front line" in the postmodern wars, "decisive moments", goals and every struggle revolve around them. Each of the belligerents tries to take control of these goals.

The analysis of postmodern military conflicts and the theoretical prediction of military conflicts in the foreseeable future indicate that the focus in military operations is based on trio-relations "spatio-temporal information". The third point-information is one of the most important characteristics characterizing the postmodern war.

Theoretical aspects of postmodern and traditional models of war. Each period of military history has its own specific technological and political characteristics in accordance with the model of war.

It should be noted that, the "war" concept has various, sometimes vague definitions in different research and military encyclopedias. For example, the war is characterized as a "social-political event" which is one the methods of solving socio-political, economic, ideological, national, religious, territorial and other conflicts among "states, nations, classes and social groups through military force". But as you can see here, for example, information-psychological impact on the opponent/enemy, the "sanctions" which occupy today's agenda (economic, scientific, technological) have not been considered as a military power.

Or in other cases, the military operations those are entirely consistent with the "war" concept which is formed in military-scientific theories are represented as "anti-terrorist operations", "the operations on the establishment of the constitutional order" and so on.

On the other hand, the application of the concepts developed in public opinion like the war on terrorism, psychological and information war, "gas wars", "water wars", environmental and diplomatic wars, sanctions, or, finally, "demographic war" is not compalsary with the use of military force. From military-scientific point of view, these concepts do not comply with the concept of traditional "war".

The wars of the twentieth century were the large-scale armed conflicts. All of the major industrial countries were practically participating in these wars. Both World wars and the forty-year-old "cold war", the mainstream of western (European) civilization - liberalism and democracy, as well as two extreme ideologies such as fascism and communism, generating the internal contradictions are no less important. Even the Japanese militarism and the Japanese government itself was based on the Western model. In the twentieth century the wars conducted by Western countries against non-Western enemies were regarded as second class warfare. So the official beginning of the Second World War is considered the attack of Germany on Poland, not Japan on

China. Most states those didn't belong to European civilization were not politically, technically and militarily developed and were lagging behind. Since the second half of the twentieth century, Western countries began to lose ground in separate regions (Suez, Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan), but though the third world had been translated into the main square of major countries' "free hunting", it remained as the military-political periphery.

The apparent progress in the field of understanding the unusual nature of the new wars happened after the attacks on September 11, 2001. That time the transformation occurred in thought of war. Since that time, researchers and policy makers in other countries began to pay attention to the aspects and nature of the new generation wars on the basis of the American experience.

However, even in 1991, on the eve of "the first Iraq war the experts were discussing the changes in the nature of military conflicts. But, until the end of the 1990s it was too early to talk about the realities of these changes in the political sense. In fact, the application speed of military and military-technical innovations in the military operations was significantly ahead of the dynamics of political changes in the nature of war. Emerging new military methods were not accompanied by adequate political consequences for its importance.

"In 1991, the United States easily defeated Iraqi National Guard and destroyed four thousand Iraqi tanks within 100 hours, where it lost only ten tanks. But it was impossible to shift the military victory onto a political victory. Therefore, the United States was obliged to implement a strategy to maintain Iraq for the next ten years" (10).

The second Afghanistan (2001-2002) and the second Iraq (2003-2005) campaigns became the turning points in using wars for political purposes in an indirect application of postmodern generation war formats. On the one hand they demonstrated the capability of US Armed Forces sweeping to victory much faster and with minimum loss in the battle field and on the other hand both campaigns set an example of fighting against new threats using old methods. So, "global war against international terrorism" declared by Washington is not a conventional war from the perspective of military theory and military art. (16)

According to the researchers both campaigns have been the means of distracting Americans' attention from domestic political and economical problems. Only a handful of experts had developed the subject about understanding the objective difficulties happened in the character of the threats and nature of the wars.

The strategical features of postmodern war: Speed, asymmetry. Postmodern stage adds another factor-speed to the

strategical "offensive" and "defensive" measures known from military science.

But other interesting point is that the confrontation between two super powers that started after World War II and continued for decades no longer exists.

Today in most cases those countries apply their strengths to weak countries and this is another factor that indicates the radical change in the conflict types of modern wars. (22)

Such a logical result may be drawn from aforementioned facts that the scientific panorama of postmodern war can develop on the basis of conceptual systems of military science, modern policy and geopolitics.

Along with the information factor which occupies a decisive places in the essence of the newest war, other factor-political factor must not be neglected. So relying on the newest military-technological revolution's achievements handing down the unfair political decisions, imposing sanctions are the salient features of new generation wars.

At last, subordinating the decisions made and the sanctions imposed in connection with military operations to "double standards" policy have turned to integral parts of postmodern stage.

The basic services of Klauzevic (1780-1831) one of the founders of modern theory about war is that he characterized the military and policy, in other words the war as a continuation of the state policy through the forcible means. (6;p. 212)

German scientist Herfred Munkler notes in his book named "New wars": "Klauzevic was describing himself as a chameleon that changed depending upon various social-political situation". Klauzevic was explaining this metaphor with three elements: 1. initial element-violence; 2. strategists' creativity, mission; 3. the rationality of decision-making politicians. (5, p.42)

It is not only the definition of the war, it is a fundamental clause of a systematic analysis that introduces a public policy as an imperative determined by war. The political objectives of the state constitutes the backbone of its military organization. Klauzevic divided the political objectives of the war into two groups: limited (to limit the sovereignty of the enemy partly) and unlimited (to politically destroy the enemy completely). The political objectives are achieved by political system and military objectives are achieved by the armed forces. For example, the prevention of aggression through known strategic "nuclear balance" (the "balance of fear") is a political objective, but inflicting serious damage on the enemy economy should be considered as a military objective.

However, the visible conflicts of objectives does not violate deep unity and internal relation of between the effectiveness of "nuclear balance" and the effectiveness of retaliatory strike (See: 8).

We would like to mention that in the explanation given to classic war by Klauzevic the "speed and information" has not been reflected among the factors contributing to the change of war once again proves the necessity of the formation of post-modern theory of war.

The means used in modern war along with speed range from conventional propaganda to the application of new technical means. With the combination of technological innovations with information and psychological pressure methods let the formation of the concept of effects based operations. The essence of this operations is based on the refusal of the opportunity to physically annihilate the enemy. Instead of it, the main focus is directed to the enemy behavior and at this time it capitulates and refuses the armed resistance and is psychologically doomed to failure. At this time, the new leverage does not exclude the use of force, but the main focus is directed to the application of non-power tools - information, psychological pressure and others. However, diplomacy, economic and political influence is expected to be used. Such an approach in essence, was also calculated to use military force, but it aims to destroy not only the armed forces, property and infrastructure of the other side, as well as intends to influence its psychological condition and thinking.

In principle, the idea of such operations is not new. The aforementioned German scientist K.Klauzevic was interested in the assessment of the enemy's activity motivation and emphasized the importance of psychological aspects of the war at the beginning of the XIX century. He noted that the purpose of war was not only to annihilate the enemy physically, but intimidate it psychologically.

Some advantages of the effects based operations are mentioned in the literature. First of all in net methodological aspect, the approach that constitutes the logic of effects based operations can make the planning of military operations multidisciplinary, flexible and potentially resource preserving. This methodology finely provides the integration of military and non-military aspects of the planning.

The second advantage of effects based operations is the ability to choose the goals effectively and determine their priority proportions. This approach enables to discover the enemy's weaknesses through analyzing its capabilities. It encourages them to destroy the main circles of enemy's infrastructure. Thus, the parallel operations against selected targets, are considered to be easy to destroy them one by one<sup>23</sup>.

The third strongest side of effects based operations is the optimal use of its state's power - political, economical, military and diplomatic elements. This is necessary because it is not right to rely only on one source of national strength: so, unilateralism leads to decrease in the

efficiency of the campaign facilitates the adaptation of the enemy to attack.

The fourth superiority of such operations is also mentioned. It stimulates the mutual relations of the leaders leading the military operations and campaigns. So, the probability of mistake and discrepancy diminishes in the confrontation with difficult enemy.

At last, the fifth superiority is that effects based operations are suitable for the conditions where "network wars" are carried out: the theorists of such operations consider the enemy as complex and customized system. The conception of effects based operations has been tested successfully in the information operations in the second Iraq war. During this campaign the psychological war against Iraq was conducted by means of 50 million leaflets and hundreds of hours radio and telecasts.

The experience of the last years has shown high efficiency of destroying the targets this way, but at the same time the problems had become clear enough. Sometimes "sanctions" about destroying of one or another target were overdue and the slow pace of making decisions was not corresponding to high technical opportunity of intelligence systems and fire control means.

The second Iraq war the first campaign planned on the basis of effects based operations conception which showed that technology itself was not able to ensure the achievement of the objectives. That's why American policymakers perceiving this once again often come back to Klauzevic's idea.

Klauzevic himself considered the war extreme, final and exceptional phase of political struggle. In his time V.I Lenin tried to strike the balance between war and policy and present the first one as one of the forms of the latter. Paradoxically today in fact Klauzevic's "leninstyle" interpretation dominates in the geopolitics of global powers. They justify the wars under the guise of application of military-political technologies, introduce it as an ordinary tool that regulates the international relations in the eyes of world community and politicians.

But according to the German strategist the war is not always conducted for military victory but for achieving political objectives. Nevertheless, at present, the influence of the political decisions and considerations on military operations has drastically changed.

Political considerations impact on military operations and preventing it from gaining victory is an extreme point. If we take the Iraqi war experience we can draw such a conclusion: In order to gain a full political victory it is not enough to take only political goals into consideration.

Asymmetric warfare – "WeakWin Wars" or? The ideas about the characteristics of modern warfare, can be determined with the help of the



factor-asymmetry.<sup>(1)</sup> The term "asymmetry" is increasingly attracting the attention of researchers, but often it is not used properly. (12; p21)

To win large armies with a small force has historically existed and was reflected in the fable so-called the confrontation of "David and Goliath" in Elah Valley dating back three thousand years.<sup>(18)</sup> In other words in a modern war the mobilization of all means to assess the potential for victory has conditioned the formation of asymmetrical paradigm.

Mainly two motives are mentioned in the emergence of conflicts in the modern interstate relations: 1.the struggle of small countries for survival; and 2. ambitions of the great powers for hegemony.<sup>(12;p.66)</sup>

Asymmetric political strategies appear in the military-political sphere, conduct of military operations and emergence of asymmetric threats.

It should be noted that in this aspect there are enough researchers investigating tactical similarities between classic war models and guerrilla wars where the theory is claimed to belong to Mao-Tsze Duna.

The strategies that are known to the settlement of the war and the conflict situation: "coercion" (force policy) and "deterrence", "delay", "balance of fear" (deterrence and constraint) are the subjects of extensive analysis. <sup>(1)</sup>The interesting part of these concepts again draws an attention to the fact of asymmetric paradigm.<sup>27</sup>

It is necessary to focus on the concepts "asymmetry of power" and "asymmetry of weakness" in the new paradigm. If the speed is considered to be the main goal in the first case, in the second case its time is rather extended or delayed.

"Asymmetry of weakness" can be observed in the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

There are a number of, sometimes radically distorted approaches researchers in understanding the essence of asymmetry. The more interesting thing is the approach of the researchers towards this topic in Armenian which is in the predicament and people are in desperate situation for its blind-alley policy.<sup>(19)</sup> The authors writes: "Asymmetry of weakness" serves the interests of the weak side for protracting the conflict forever. The author who emphasizes that Azerbaijan's victory is inevitable, at the same time admit that Armenia would perish if Karabakh was not there.

Azerbaijan has consistently emphasized from all tribunes that its able to restore out territorial integrity along with the principles of

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<sup>27</sup>the paradigm is a model or example that predominantly used in the military operations.



international law/ Azerbaijan military forces is the most powerful and modern army of the region. (23)

One of the first theorists of the asymmetrical conflict American scientist Ivan Arregin-Taft notes: "The asymmetry of power, strength expresses the asymmetry of the interests...So powerful actors are less interested in victory. Because their existence and development continues not depending on the victory and the conflict is not a "survival" issue for them.

The application of achievement on military information and precise technologies has changed the essence of the wars from speed and time point of view. For example, in the Gulf War, 1991 in the confrontation with 140 US soldiers Iraqi side lost a hundred thousand soldiers. Another unprecedented example in the military history is the victory gained in Kosovo without losing even a single soldier.

Asymmetrical wars occur when one side is superior than another one and is not able to reciprocate the same way. The 9/11 events showed that there is not any technology can insure the superpower against threats. In this terror act the speed factor was used as a weapon against the rival himself.

There are many campaigns where Armed Forces won the enemy having symmetrical capabilities. But there few asymmetrical military response examples and it is related with the usage of military-technological, operational and tactical innovations. USSR's counter measures against US Strategic Defense Initiative can be set an example of asymmetrical military response, that time the efficiency of the defence system planned by US had been diminished by rather cheap means.

Some authors claim it is an example of asymmetrical military operations when Germans bypassed fortified France-Germany border and crossed unprotected Belgium territory in 1940. In reality the reference to this example is not convincing. It was a failure of political will rather than asymmetrical military operations. In the tactical level there was a discrepancy in the degree of preparation between France and Germany.

US campaign in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 is an obvious example of asymmetrical operation (high technologies against simple weapons). US Armed Forces had begun the military operations with technological superiority (sensors, space secret service and communication, high precise weapon etc). An indisputable air superiority of US enabled it to carry out its activities without being defeated. Neither Taliban nor "Al-Kaida" was able to demonstrate something in comparison with US and its allies.(17; 90)

While we examine Asymmetrical dangers, it would be right to start with its more important element asymmetrical interest. Sometimes asymmetrical danger is able speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops, restrict freedom of movement of stronger state and reduce its will to meddle in other's business.

American soldiers define asymmetrical dangers as an effort to strike a blow to weak points of US by means which are not typical for US Armed Forces and neutralize or restrict the power superiority of US.

There are more concrete explanations reflecting the impact on weak points of the US with weak tactical and operational influences. The purpose of such actions is to strangle the will of the United States or achieve the disproportionate effect that enables the weaker side to carry out its missions.

Not only weak countries are obliged to use asymmetrical dangers. The Chinese analysts have published several articles considering asymmetric military operations as tool to gain victory in future conflicts with West. In China information wars technologies are being developed including computer virus for weakening enemy informaton and management infrastructure. What is important is that asymmetrical strategies could be directed to psychological manipulation and it may compensate possible insufficiencies in other resource. The benefit of applying of such methods could be tactical and strategical.

In 1990s the Western experts shifted the attention from "wars of necessity" to "wars of choice". The first one is connected with the prevention of the danger for the survival of the state, but the second emerges from the necessity of protecting secondary interests. (17)

Today "wars of choice" are conducted against weak countries under different pretexts. Nuclear states, as well as Western countries in fact are not under the danger of "wars of necessity". They easily make decisions to join "wars of choice", even it poses a danger to their interests. In this case al "humanitarian interventions" are typical "wars of choice". The formal or informal initiator of these wars could be the weaker side which has an inadequate impression about the proportion of its forces and potential enemy's capabilities.

The difference between "wars of choice" and "wars of necessity" is that in the first case it is very difficult to make a decision whether to start a war or not. Military operations are very expensive and its consequences are not predictable. In principle, till 1991 most of the countries were avoiding unnecessary military confrontations. In this case Iraq's attack on Kuveyt was accepted as "a terrible anomaly". Then the model of the international behaviour began to change. NATO members those considered themselves powerful were courageously and openly

using military power and other countries were relatively acting suspiciously. (12)

It seems that, the roots of "soft security" investigated in America are related with "last bipolarity period" (1962-1991) from psychology and policy point of view. This reflect an approach of divided liberal-realists on the danger of conflicts shifting into full-scale calamity by participation of the nuclear states<sup>29</sup>. Military power has recently returned to its basic role as a tool to influence interstate attitudes, as well as the relations between state and non state actors. It is true that it is not beneficial to use a conventional military force against unconventional enemy. Asymmetrical dangers demand absolutely new strategies against them. The aspect of information-psychological wars occupy the first place. Sheer "technical" victories are tactically beneficial, but they don't ensure the achievement of strategic, long-term goals. The military victory of the US is completely obvious, but we can not say it about the war against terrorism and campaign on "Iraqi democracy". The real victory obviously does not chime with expected victory.

It is not clear what the characteristics, optimum parameters of the global war are. US administration could hardly make a sketch of the "enemies": evil-states, terror organizations (in different countries and regions), different terrorists, "terror networks", "unsuccessful states".(16)

Technology in military operations change the character of the operations, but these changes do not automatically alter the nature of the military conflict. Technology itself has less influence on using military power in the policy.

The transformation to high technologies in the military operations, in the hostile environment of local population fight capability was accompanied with the dearth of infantry units. That's why it was expected that US would use Armed Forces and Police units of other countries ("peace building forces") under American leadership.

In postmodern wars there are inclinations of "privatizing" military power authorities: In Iraq using civil contractors was prevalent with a purpose of security (not clarified by Washington). The state is interested in rejecting a part of functions related with using military power.(19)

The interest to use asymmetrical rule in the military operations to achieve military-political goals is increasing. It comprises unpredictable tactics, use of weapons in order to either politically defeat the enemy or neutralize it. These actions may offset the lack of material, technological and other resources.

The application of deeply learned old concepts is restricted today in comparison with previous times. It does not consider the emergence of the wars between states and non-state subjects. New strategies are required for new kind conflicts.

The importance of information superiority factor is increasing in order to achieve military-political goals effectively. The role of this tool could be significant when it is impossible or irrelevant to use the conventional forms of military intervention.

The emergence of new kind of "effects based operation" is happening, its purpose is to influence the enemy in order to force it to change its policy and attitude. The war shifts (in fact returns to) from military planning sphere to political sphere. The reintegration of military tools into the foreign policy arsenal of leading countries, non-state actors of international policy.

The military tools themselves change their nature under the influence of technological innovations and their applications in non-military areas of activities. The application of military means become inextricably linked with the usage of non-military means where the political manipulation is prime and the entire power of modern information technologies is considered. Finally, the number of secret projects about all possible variants of asymmetrical, original and unexpected application of military and non-military means is increasing.

Conclusion. If we systematize the basic inclination and features of postmodern wars we may note the following:

The "privatization" of states' military-power functions, the "commercialization" of military-industrial complexes;

The transition of the wars. In these types of wars the borders don't play any role and these wars are not between the states (in the example of ISIS);

The application of high technology in order to strike the targets;

The obvious manipulation of the wars between the subjects without any legitimate status;

Demilitarization of the war - its conduct without any force on the ground, with drones etc.

The surge in the importance of the factor of information superiority in order to achieve the goals more efficiently;

Along with information factor - political factor should not be neglected. So relying on the most recent military-technological revolution and handing down unfair political decisions, imposing sanctions are the characteristics of new generation wars.

At last, the subordination of the imposed sanctions and decisions to "double standards" policy is a salient feature of postmodern stage.

When we speak about postmodern wars it is necessary to note that all the present processes observed in the world civilization spell big scale

military conflicts. It is possible to say that the enhancement of rapid armament in all regions of the world, especially Asia-Pacific Ocean regions and arab world is a typical example of it. The changes in "center-half-periphery-periphery" system which have resulted in regional and global conflicts are happening in front of our eyes. Asia-Pacific Ocean is increasingly becoming the bone of contention, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa) has emerged, Russia is trying to reintegrate the post-soviet countries, Turkey and Iran claim regional leadership (possibly the global leadership if is able to lead Islam world). Persian Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council is following Western Europe path by creating united financial-economical politics and military system. ISIS's claim to create "Great caliphate" gave an impetus to test the most modern forms of war. The combination of traditional "strategical trio" (air-land-sea) of coalition forces with different innovations against terrorist groups, states' efforts to conduct united operations by applying the results of military information revolution are among aforementioned innovations.

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